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Abstract
This investigation was concerned with how problem-solving may be
Influenced by personality characteristics and interactions between
these characteristics and immediate environmental events which serve
as background for the problem-solving task. Within this framework of
personality-environmental interactive influences upon problem-solving
behavior this investigation also attempted to resolve a theoretical
controversy concerning a widely used personality measure, the M-C SD
scale. The question to be resolved was whether this instrument measured
both an approach-type need for approval and defensive avoidance of
disapproval as the originators, Crowne and Marlowe, claimed, or whether
the measure could be more parsimoniously interpreted as measuring
avoidant, defensive behavior alone. Specifically it was posited that
under approving feedback conditions the high M-C SD person would perform
more efficiently than a low M-C SD person on a concept-attainment task,
while under negative feedback the reverse would be true. It was also
hypothesized that if the M-C SD scale does reflect n-app., the high
M-C SD individual in the approving feedback condition would show a
shorter average latency of response, approach behavior, than high M-C
SD individuals in a control, neutral feedback condition. The results of
an analysis of variance for the dependent variable measuring problem-
solving efficiency were contrary to what had been hypothesized as the
high M-C SD individuals, under the approving feedback condition, were
less efficient than the. other sub-groups. A distractabllity factor was
offered as an explanation for the unexpected results. The findings
ii
with the dependent measure used to assess approach or avoidance, re
sponse latency, were inconclusive due to an inability to establish
a neutral or control group. It was concluded that though there is
deed some type of evaluative dependency measured by the M-C SD seal
that this investigation was unable to more specifically clarify the
nature of this orientation.
ii
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INTRODUCTION
A description of the research context of this proposed investigation
would state that it is concerned with the effects of the interaction be-
tween personality and immediate enviornmental variables and how this in-
teraction may influence problem-solving behaviors of an individual. This
focus upon the interactive effects between the individual's personality
and his immediate environment and how these effects influence behavior
is a reflection of the increasing recognition that accurate behavioral
prediction requires knowledge of conditions which are impinging upon an
individual in a given situation. A leading proponent of the cross-situ-
ational specificity of behavior is Walter Mischel. In evaluating current
efforts to tlieorize upon tha nature of personality, he notes that:
Sophisticated dispositional personality theories
increasingly have come to recognize that behavior
tends to change with alterations in the situations
in which it occurs. They note, however, that the
same basic underlying disposition (or genotype)
may manifest itself behaviorally in diverse ways in
I
different situations so that heterogeneous behaviors
can be signs of the same underlying trait or state
(Mischel, 1968, p. 38).
A more specific example of this increased emphasis upon the importance |
of the personality-environment interaction in predicting behavior is
illustrated in the following recent study.
Kates and Barry (1970) showed that successful problem-solving Is de-
pendent both on personality factors and on interactions between these
factors, task-related demands, and environmental conditions. It was de-
monstrated that individuals assessed as high on the personality character-
istic failure-avoidance, under task conditions which required verbalization
of the correct solution of a concept-attainment problem and which involved
negative experimenter feedback, in contrast to individuals low on
failure-avoidance, developed a handicapping caution which signifi-
cantly impeded task-solution. However, when conditions were changed
so that (1) task-solution required a non-verbal criterion, (2) there
was a subtle omission as to what the tempo of solution should be, and
(3) the mode of experimenter feedback v;as of a more neutral, much less
censuring nature, it was the high failure-avoidant who excelled.
The results of this study delineate a personality characteristic,
failure-avoidance, which when prominent in an individual under conditions
of social censure elicits avoidance responses which hinder conceptual
problem-solving. Further, the findings of Kates and Barry demonstrate
unequivocally that the same basic underlying disposition, failure-
avoidance, manifests itself behaviorally in apparently diverse ways,
relative success or non-success in concept-attainment, given different
task-related situations. In doing this, it empirically reaffirms
Mischel's statement concerning dispositional personality theories.
Finally, this study in part lends substantiation to the contention that
more focus is needed upon the specific conditions of different test
situations and the interaction between these conditions and motivational
and/or personality factors.
This proposed investigation, then, is a continuation, in terms of
its principal assumptions, of the perspectives on personality expressed
and the study just described. It assumes that problem-solving behavior
is functionally related to personality dispositions and interactions
between these dispositions and the immediate enviromaent . Specifically,
3we shall be Investigating the personality construct measured by the
Marlowe-Crovme Social Desirability Scale (M-C SD) and which is
described in the literature as need for approval (n-app.). This
proposal shall be concerned with assessing the influence of a high
or low score on the M-C SD scale upon problem-solving behaviors
utilizing concept-attainment tasks and various types of experimenter
feedback. In addition, and no less importantly, this investigation
shall attempt to resolve a controversy surrounding the M-C SD scale,
which, briefly, is whether the scale can be taken as a measure of
both need for approval and defensiveness , as is claimed by its
originators, or whether the scale measures simply defensiveness alone.
This investigation represents an initial effort to study the possible
interrelationships between high or low scores on the M-C SD scale with
conceptual tasks under different types of experimental feedback.
THE PERSONALITY VARIABLE
Crowne and Marlowe (1960) have devised a scale which measures
the degree to which individuals evaluated themselves in a socially
desirable fashion. Scores on this scale initially represented re-
sponse sets of individuals in a test-taking situation. Later, based
upon certain empirical findings, they posited that this social desira-
bility measure reflected a personality variable, need for approval.
Finally, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability (M-C SD) Scale was
further described as evaluating not only need for approval (n-app.)
but defensiveness also.
The M-C SD scale is distinguished from its popularly used prede-
cessor, the Edv/ards Social Desirability Scale, in that it uses items
that were either (1) culturally acceptable but probably untrue or
(2) culturally unacceptable but probably true of most people. In
either case, these items, unlike those of the Edwards SD scale, were
not clinically oriented. An example on the M-C SD scale of a culturally
acceptable and probably untrue item would be "I have never intensely
disliked anyone," while an example of a culturally unacceptable and
probably true item is "I like to gossip at times." On the other hand,
items on the Edwards SD Scale were derived from the M. M.P.I, and, as has
been stated, were clinically oriented. As a consequence, Crowne and
Marlowe ftit that though the Edwards SD items have been represented as
measuring the v.'ish to appear socially desirable, in truth it may only
be assessing whether an individual will or will not acknowledge whether
he does or does not possess the maladaptive behaviors described in the
5scale. In summary, the original purpose of the M-C SD scale was to
serve as a "pure" measure of a person's tendency to portray himself
in a socially desirable fashion regardless of his degree of psycho-
logical adjustment.
As was mentioned, the M-C SD scale, at first a response-bias
measure, came to be interpreted as a more personality-related in-
strument. Crowne and Marlowe contend that a high score on their in-
strument has broader personality implications than merely representing
a social-desirability response set. They feel that the high M-C SD
individual is greatly dependent upon the acceptance, recognition, and
approval of others; thus, the M-C SD scale is an indirect measure of
need for approval (n-app.). In addition to a n-app. interpretation of
their scale, Marlowe and Crowne later posited defensiveness as being
reflected by their instrument. This contention that the M-C SD scale
reflects dual personality dispositions of n-app. and def ensiveness is
disputed, however, by Jacobson and Ford (1966) and Ford and Herson
(1967), who believe that the M-C SD scale measures defensiveness only.
First we will examine how Marlowe and Crowne arrived successively at
the n-app. and defensiveness interpretations. Then v/e shall take up
the evidence in support of defensiveness as the sole personality trait
tapped by their instrument.
Marlowe and Crowne (1961) hypothesized that during an experiment,
high M~C SD subjects would try to maintain the favorable evaluation of
the experimenter. To test this hypothesis, a number of subjects
participated in a tedious, boring experimental task. Following the
completion of the task, those subjects who attained a high M-C SD
scale score described their experiences more favorably. The investi-
gators felt that this favorable evaluation was prompted by a wish
to ingratiate themselves with the experimenter and portray themselves
in a favorable, socially sanctioned manner. They inferred that this
was due to a need on the part of high M-C SD individuals to obtain
approval from others.
A common assumption made by Marlowe and Crowne and associates
was that high M-C SD scale persons enter into psychological experiments
with a strong desire to do well and be positively regarded. Because
of this entering set, in a triad of studies of verbal conditioning it
was both predicted and confirmed that high M-C SD subjects would show
more significant conditioning effects. In the first two experiments,
utilizing direct operant verbal reinforcement, the high M-C SD subjects
produced more plural nouns and positive self -reference (Crowne and
Strickland, 1961; Marlowe, 1962). The third study employed a vicarious
reinforcement paradigm. High and low M-C SD subjects were given the'
opportunity to observe others in the experiment prior to their own
participation. It was hypothesized that, because of their need to do
well in the eyes of the experimenter, the high M-C SD would focus, in
a self-reinforcing manner, on the subtle verbal social rewards given
to the observed subject. As was stated, the high, as contrasted with
the low M-C SD subjects, did show more rapid conditionability when it
was time for their own participation (Marlowe, Beecher, Cook, and Doob,
196A).
7Further evidence that the M-C SD scale reflects need for approval
was demonstrated by Olsen (1967). She found that individuals high on
the M-C SD scale had a higher volunteering rate for psychology experi-
ments and that this high rate was pronounced when the high M-C SD indi-
vidual had positive expectations as to his performance during the experi-
ment. This finding illustrates the ingratiating behavior of the high
M-C SD subject and his fear of "looking bad" during an experiment.
Consonant with a n-app. interpretation of the M-C SD scale, other investi-
gations indicate that the high M-C SD individual has been found to be
more field-dependent (Rosenfield, 1967), has more difficulty in recognizing
and expressing hostility toward others (Schill and Black, 1967; Conn and
Crowne, 1964), and, if prevailed upon by the experimenter, would cheat
in order to please him (Lanyon and Drotar, 1968).
As has been described, Crowne and Marlowe later added defensiveness
as an additional personality characteristic reflected by the M-C SD
measure. In their joint publication (Crowne and Marlowe, 1964), they
outline several studies whose findings cumulatively suggest that the high
M-C SD person is likely to evince self-protective defensive behaviors.
This dual interpretation of the M-C SD score began with Barthel's investi-
gation of the relationship between goal-setting in a game situation and
M-C SD scores (Barthel, 1961). Barthel first hypothesized that high
M-C SD persons would conform more to normative social standards for goal-
setting in a competitive game situation. In attempting to account for
his positive findings, Barthel included defensiveness as well as n-app.
in his explanations, equating the behavioral restriction of the high M-C
8SD individual in goal-setting with "defensive rigidity." It was in
commenting upon Barthel's findings and "defensive rigidity" explanation
that Crowne and Marlowe first mentioned defensive behavior as an
additional correlate of high M-C SD scores.
Strickland and Crowne (1963) further document the "defensiveness
hypothesis" as an aspect of the M-C SD scale. They hypothesized that
high M-C SD individuals, manifesting an avoidant type of resistance,
would seek early termination of psychotherapy sessions. They reasoned
that the need for the high M-C SD person to maintain the approval of
the psychotherapist would cause him to find the demands for personal
revelations, involving self
-demeaning characteristics, to the therapist
as too threatening. This hypothesis was borne out and further confirmed
by the therapist's rating of the high M-C SD individual while in therapy
as being more defensive than the low M-C SD person. Tutko (1962),
utilizing an institutionalized population, predicted that under stress-
ful instructions the high M-C SD person would give constricted, defensive,
unproductive, and obtensibly less pathological projective test protocols.
This prediction was found to be accurate. A recent variation of Tutko 's '
study with college students, using Rorschack's M as a measure of ex-
pressiveness, essentially corroborated his findings and also delineated
the importance of considering the interaction between n-app., defensive-
ness, and the specific situation in making behavioral predictions
(Lefcourt, 1969).
;
Follow-up studies by other investigators utilizing the M-C SD scale
tend to further illustrate that this scale taps both n-app. and defensiveness
I
9In practically all of these studies it is assumed by the investigators
that defensive behavior is a consequence of high n-app. In a study
investigating the effects of high and low scores on the M-C SD scale on
willingness to participate in a group discussion, it was found that when
high M-C SD individuals were offered a choice between taking a salient
role involving greater evaluative threat or a less prominent role
offering little opportunity for approbation, they would significantly
more often choose the latter role (Efran and Boylin, 1967). Another
investigator reasoned that in a group setting, by varying the conditions
under which evaluative feedback is given (either public or private),
the high M-C SD person, because of a need for approval, would manifest
significantly greater sensitivity when feedback was accomplished via
public announcement, ilis predictions were accurate (Nicholson, 1967),
and, in addition, it was found that high M-C SD persons were signifi-
cantly more cautious and conservative in setting goals or choosing
difficulty levels in order to ensure success and ward off negative
evaluative feedback. This is a replication of the findings of an
earlier investigation in which it was demonstrated that high M-C SD
persons under conditions of "ego- threat" take precautions tc guarantee
success in a competitive game situation (Barthel, 1963). Yet a third
study replicated the cautious goal-setting behavior of high M-C SD
individuals and also supported tlie hypothesis that approval-oriented
individuals are viewed by their peers as socially defensive (Thaw and
Efran, 1967).
On the other hand, some studies have used the M-C SD instrument
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as a measure of defensiveness only. In order to employ the Taylor
Manifest Anxiety Scale most effectively, the M-C SD scale was used
to pinpoint and eliminate those defensive Ss who are prone to
anxiousness but may have refused to admit it on the TMAS. A signifi-
cant difference on digit symbol performance favoring lov;-anxious Ss was
found only when the defensive (high SD low-anxious Ss (low TMAS) were
eliminated from analysis (Boor and Schill, 1967). In another study
concerned with defensiveness and anxiety, it was hypothesized that
highly defensive Ss (high M-C SD scale score) would have less variance
on the Cattell Anxiety Scale than those Ss low in defensiveness . The
rationale was that highly defensive Ss would be restricted in the extent
to which they could admit to behaviors both socially undesirable and
implicative of psychopathology
, whereas Ss low in defensiveness would
include Ss who suffered from psychopathological conditions and admitted
to them as well as Ss who did not suffer from such conditions. The
prediction was found to be accurate (Fisher and Kramer, 1963). Breger,
in citing the fact that the high M-C SD subject displays more covert
hostility on the T.A.T. and also the fact of a strong inverse relation-
ship between the M-C SD scale and a measure of insightfulness
,
supports
the interpretation of the scale as a measure of "repressive ego-defensive-
ness" (1966). Another study found a significant but low negative
correlation between the M-C SD scale and the Byrne Repression-Sensiti-
zation measure. The high M-C SD individual scores on the low end of
the Byrne R-S. Since this end of the Bryne R-S assesses repressive
avoidance and denial-of-threat types of defenses, these results augment
11
and tend to validate the findings thus far described. The investi-
gators in this study, on the basis of this relationship and additional
results which indicate that defensive respressors (high M-C SD, low
Byrne R-S) had a significantly higher auditory perceptual threshold
for sexual sentences than either sensitizers or non-defensive repressors
conclude that the M-C iSD scale "might be a better instrument for
assessing approach and avoidance behaviors to threatening stimuli than
the Byrne scale" (Schill and Althoff, 1968).
This focus upon the relationship between a repressive denial-
avoidant type of defensiveness and the M-C SD scale is both reaffirmed
and taken one step further by those individuals who have been cited
earlier as advocates of a defensiveness only interpretation of the
instrument, Jacobson and Ford (1966) and Ford and Herson (1967).
Jacobson and Ford (1966) feel that their findings indicate that the
high M-C SD person, who is supposed to possess a need to take account
of such cues to gain social approval, is not more sensitive to subtle
cultural cues. They feel instead that the high M-C SD individual has
an "evaluation-orientation" and that their results indicate "the
orientation is away rather than toward and involves a repressive rather
than a sensitizing type of response." Ford and Herson (1967) hypothe-
sized that if high M-C SD scale responding .represents defensiveness
,
following personal failure the high M-C SD person would manifest less
intropunitiveness, as measured by the Rosenzweig Picture Completion Test.
The confirmation of their hypothesis led them to reiterate the specu-
lation that the "popular interpretation of the M-C SD scale in terms of
12
n~app. may need to be revised".
The theoretical differences as to what is measured by the M-C SD
scale are relatively clearly outlined. The originators, Crowne and
Marlowe, postulate a need for approval with a concomitant interpersonal
defensiveness as being reflected in their instrument. Others imply,
however, that empirical evidence does not justify a need-for-approval
construct but supports defensiveness only. A major focus of this
proposed investigation will be an attempt to clarify this area of
controversy. It is felt that this clarification can be achieved by
setting up certain experimental conditions, involving approving and
censuring experimenter feedback, within which individuals shall be
required to solve a conceptual task and, by using latency of responses
to task stimuli as a dependent measure, to assess need for approval
(approach) and/or defensiveness (avoidance) tendencies.
13
THE PERSONALITY-ENVIRONMENTAL INTERACTION
Experimental conditions set up to achieve the goal of clarifying
what the M-C SD scale measures have been mentioned. In order to
understand how these experimental conditions and a dependent measure,
latency of response, may resolve this theoretical controversy, it may
be helpful to briefly review pertinent background research in two
areas. The first area concerns itself with how personality character-
istics effect success or failure in problem-solving and performance
tasks, Strickland and Jenkins (1964) hypothesized that the high M-C
SD scale score individual's desire to do as well as possible in social
situations would be generalized to performance on motor tasks. Their
results indicated that the high M-C SD scale individual showed a
significantly better performance rate than the low M~C SD individual
with a rotary-pursuit, time-on -target type of task. These investigators
concluded that, in general, high M~C SD Ss tend to perform as v/ell as
possible in order to maintain the favorable evaluation of others;
hence, they responded to the perceived demands of E and the situation
in a cooperative
J
achieving manner. Wellington and Strickland (1965)
confirmed that tlie high M~C SD individuals would perform significantly
better on a series of motor tasks, which led them to posit a general
relationship between desire to achieve favorable evaluations and motor
and social behavior. Rosenfield (1967) predicted that because of the
high M-C SD individual's omnipresent fear of being negatively evaluated,
a delayed auditory feedback task, which is highly conducive to eliciting
errors, would be especially threatening to these individuals and that
they would consequently have a slower rate of speech in the D.A.F.
to guard against errors in the form of speech disruption. The re-
sults of the study confirmed Rosenfield's predictions. Finally,
Crandall (1968) found that high M-C SD persons required fewer trials
to learn a paired-associates task because, as he states, of their
strong ego-involvement.
Representative of the second body of research, concerned with
the effects of experimenter feedback upon human problem-solving, are
the early studies of Hulon and Katz (1935) and Silleck and Lapha
(1937). Both investigations, in assessing the relative effects of
emphasis upon right or wrong responses in human maze-learning, demon
strated inferior performances for those individuals who learned via
an experimenter focus upon their mistakes. Sechrest and Wallace
(1962), on the basis of their findings, speculated that experimenter
feedback may be interpreted by subjects as either an informational
response or as an aversive appraisal. Later, Wallace (196A) found
that hypothesis-inhibition occurred significantly more often with
negative herbal feedback ("vTrong'" or"incorrect") than when in im-
personal auditory tone of low intensity was used. He concluded, in
a definite manner, that human verbal feedback may take on aversive
properties and thus has a motivational as well as informational
potential. Byers (1965) noted that subjects increasingly delayed
responding and offered fewer responses, or hypotheses, about the
concept as they progressed through a series of concept-attainment
problems. He suggested that the subjects inhibited hypothesis-
verbalizations to avoid experimental invalidations which they
15
interpreted to be punitive and delayed these verbalizations until
they obtained what they believed to be the necessary supportive
evidence
.
In the above investigations, as with that of Kates and Barry
(1970), reluctance to respond on the part of the subject has either
been speculated upon or directly interpreted as an avoidance tendency
prompted by verbal experimenter invalidations which have aversive
properties. Buss (1956), utilizing latency of response to conceptual
stimuli as an explicit dependent measure, conducted an especially
relevant experiment since, in addition, he used the specific types of
corrective verbal feedback ("right" or "wrong") which shall be used
in this proposal. He found that groups exposed to a preponderance of
corrective "rights" had significantly shorter response latencies than
groups who underwent verbal feedback consisting primarily of "wrong."
\7hat is important to glean from these studies (Buss
,
1956; Sechrest
and Wallace, 1962; Wallace, 1964; Kates and Barry, 1970) is that
negative verbal experimenter feedback appears to be an important factor
with respect to response-delay shown by subjects. Consequently, for
this proposal response latency has been chosen as a dependent variable
to measure the length of time taken by subjects to respond under
different verbal feedback conditions. It is hoped that this latency
measure will reveal whether high M-C SD subjects delay longer under
negative feedback (show avoidant defensive characteristics) and/or
respond more quickly (show approach tendencies) when positive evalua-
tion is anticipated. This use of latency of response as a measure of
16
approach-avoidance behavior is not without research precedence.
Marlett and Watson (1968), demonstrating that failure feedback
over trials increased the strength of avoidance behavior, used
latency of response as a measure of avoidance. It is not too
much of an inferential leap to say that if increased response
latency is taken as a fiieasure of avoidance, then decreased
latency of response can be used to indicate approach.
In this section so far we have briefly reviewed background
studies on the effects first of personality characteristics and
then of experimental feedback variables upon performance in
problem-solving and performance tasks. To conclude this section
of the proposal, it may be most appropriate to describe a couple
of studies which have special relevance in that both personality
and experimental feedback variables are manipulated concurrently,
as shall be done in this proposed investigation.
Heilbrun, Orr, and Harrell (1966) demonstrated a relationship
between different patterns of parental child-rearing and vulner-
ability to cognitive disturbance when mistakes in a cognitive task
resulted in social censure. They found that a group of college
students in the parent-rejected group (high control-lov; nurturance)
demonstrated significant impairment of conceptual performance under
censuring conditions (a verbal response "wrong") . In explaining
the significant learning inefficiency of the parent-rejected group,
these investigators offered an interpretation of an internal,
interfering, avoidant- type response which was incompatible with
17
effective task-behavior. Thus, in this study an interaction
between differing family antecedents, conditions of nurturance
and control, and censuring experimenter feedback results in
individual differences in perception of experimenter feedback
and apparently causes differential cognitive functioning on a
concept-attainment task. Strickland (1965) found that of four
experimental groups, the high M-C SD subjects run under positive,
approving conditions showed the greatest improvement in motor
performance over trials, while the high M-C SD subjects, under
negative-feedback conditions, showed the poorest performance.
This study demonstrates the greater disposition of the high M-C
SD individual to be influenced, for better or worse, by positive
and negative verbal feedback.
To sum up this section of the proposal, it has first been an
attempt to describe a number of research studies which serve as
the background from which this investigation shall be a logical
extension. More specifically, two of the primary experimental
conditions shall consist of a personality variable, high or low
M-C SD scale scores, and three types of experimenter feedback,
approving, censuring, and neutral. In establishing the research
precedence for these experimental conditions, the results of the
findings of these studies shall also be influential in determining
the content of tlie formal hypotheses which shall be stated. Secondly,
within this section several studies have been cited which serve as
the empirical rationale for the use of latency of response as a measure
of approach and avoidance. The following section of the proposal
pertains to the third and last experimental condition, level of
problem-dif f iculty
.
19
THE CONCEPTUAL TASK
The tasks which shall be used in this proposed investigation
fall within the realm of conceptual learning. As is pointed out by
Bourne (1966), the term "concept" has a number of definitions.
Roughly paraphrasing, it can mean an idea, refer to an abstraction,
or perhaps be synonymous with a mental image. With respect to this
investigation. Bourne's operational definition of a concept "as a
category of things" or "a concept exists whenever two or more dls
tinguishable objects or events have been grouped or classified to-
gether and set apart from other objects on the basis of some common
feature or property characteristic of each" is quite appropriate.
Uaygood and Bourne (1965) have demonstrated that conceptual
learning can be analyzed into two major components, attribute or
value identification and recognition of the conceptual rule. As an
example of the first component, utilizing the dimension geometric
forms, the attributes or values of this dimension which may have to
be identified might involve squareness, roundness, or triangularity.
Secondly, In order to attain a concept, an Individual must also be
able to recognize the conceptual rule by which the values are combined
to form the concept. As defined by Bourne (1966), "Conceptual rules
are rules for grouping. They specify how the relevant attributes are
combined for use in classifying stimuli." As examples of conceptual
rules, the two types which shall be used in this investigation and
which will create the third and final independent variable, level of
problem-difficulty, can be briefly described.
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The first type of rule is that of conjunctiveness, in which
examples of a particular concept involve the "joint presence of"
two or more attributes. For example, if the concept is that of a
red square, then all examples (or instances) which contain both
redness and squareness together would be representative of the
concept. The second, and more difficult, type of rule is that of
disjunctivGness, in which examples of a particular concept involve
the presence of "either one or the other of tv;o or more attributes."
Again, if the concept is that of a red square, then all instances
which contain either redness or squareness (and both together in
the case of inclusive disjunctiveness) would be representative of
the concept.
Various writers have speculated as to why disjunctivity in
conceptual learning results in much greater problem-difficulty as
contrasted with conjunctiveness. In delineating the reasons for
these differences in difficulty, Bruner, Goodnow, and Austin (1962)
point out that there is an "asymmetry of inference from defining
attributes to class membership and from class member sliip to defining
attributes" that is existent with disjunctivenss but not with
conjuncti-irity . Knowing the definitions of the disjunctive class
(red squares) can lead only to probabilistic predictions about the
properties of exemplars (either red or square). As Shore (1967)
points out, on the other hand, with conjunctive concepts, certainty
statements may be made, since deduction of the concept (red squares)
depends on the presence of the relevant features (redness and squareness)
21
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in all Instances of the concept. Thus, one can make absolute pre-
dictions about the relevant attributes of an example of a conjunctive
concept while there is uncertainty in this respect with disjunctive
concepts. Bruner suggests that this certainty of prediction is
responsible for the preference which people demonstrate for conjunctive
conceptualization as contrasted with disjunctiveness
.
In the study by Kates and Barry (1970) , it was demonstrated that
a personality variable which was influential in determining efficiency
in attaining disjunctive concepts did not have as pronounced affects
with conjunctive problems. By including this independent variable,
level of problem-difficulty, it is hoped that the generalizability of
these findings can be assessed under different experimental conditions,
utilizing the M-C SD scale.
To summarize, a broad aim of this investigation is to attempt to
ascertain in what manner problem-solving behavior may be related to
personality characteristics and interactions between these character-
istics and varying surroundings within which the problem is presented.
Specifically stated, a prime concern is whether high-or-low
scoring M~C SD individuals are differentially affected in their concept-
attainment efficiency under various types of experimenter feedback,
censuring, approving, and neutral, with two different levels of
problem-difficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive. Within this framework
of possible personality-environment influences upon concept-attainment
behavior, this investigation shall also attempt to resolve a theoretical
controversy extant concerning the widely used personality measure, the
M-C SD scale. Simply stated, the problem to be resolved is whether
this instrument measures both an approach-type need for approval and
defensive avoidance of disapproval, as the originators, Crowne and
Marlowe, claim, or whether the measure can be more parsimoniously
interpreted as measuring avoidant defensive behavior alone. It is
hoped that with the aid of the three types of experimenter feedback
described and utilizing a second dependent measure, latency of re-
sponse, this question may be clarified.
MAJOR HYPOTHESES
The first set of hypotheses which pertain to the independent
variable, type of experimenter feedback, and the dependent variable,
average latency of response, is as follows:
1. The approving type of experimenter feedback will
generate approach responses generally among high
and low M-C SD subjects, resulting in shorter
average response latencies than under the neutral
feedback condition.
2. A disapproving type of experimenter feedback will
generate avoidance responses generally among both
high and low M-C SD subjects, causing the average
response latency to be significantly longer than
for the neutral feedback condition.
3. The significant effects predicted above for the
latency of response and type of experimenter
feedback shall hold under both levels of problem-
difficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive.
The second set of hypotheses pertaining to the independent variable,
high or low M-C SD scale score, and the dependent variable, average
latency of response, is as follows:
4. Reflecting the consensus of opinion as to a de-
fensive avoidant component associated with a high
M-C SD scale score, individuals in this group
under the disapproving condition shall have a
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significantly longer average latency of response
than the high M-C SD control group. In addition,
this longer latency shall be longer than that for
any group or subgroup in the design.
5. Relevant to response latency of the M-C SD groups
under approving feedback, if a high M-C SD scale
score is in fact reflective of a high n-app.,
then approval-seeking, approach types of behavior
among the high M-C SD group shall result in a
significantly shorter average response latency
as contrasted with the control. In addition,
this significantly shorter latency should be
shorter than that for any other group or sub-
group in the design.
6. The significant effects both predicted and con-
ditionally hypothesized as occurring with respect
to the dependent measure latency of response and
the variable high or low score on the M-C SD
scale shall hold under both levels of problem-
difficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive.
The third and final set of hypotheses pertains to the number of
instances to solution, the dependent variable measuring efficiency
of problem-solving, and the independent measure of high and low M-C
SD scale score and type of experimenter feedback:
If we can generalize from previously cited
studies, it can be hypothesized that the
efficiency of the high M-C SD person under
censuring feedback will be impaired, re-
sulting in a significantly higher number of
trials to solution than that of the low M-C
SD individual.
Conversely, and again making a tentative
generalization from prior studies, the high
M-C SD group under the approving condition
will be more efficient than the low's,
requiring fewer number of trials to criterion.
The final hypothesis is that the differences
in efficiency hypothesized for the personality
variable high or low M-C SD will be most
pronounced under the higher level of problem-
difficulty involving the disjunctive task.
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METHOD
SUBJECTS
The M-C SD scale was administered to a group of 365 students at
the University of Massachusetts. There were two criteria for selection
for the experimental groups. First an individuals scale score had to
fall at either extreme of the distribution. Those individuals who fell
in the high M-C SD scale group had a mean of X « 21.03. Those individuals
in the low M-C SD scale group had a mean of X = A. 78. For both the
extreme groups on the personality measure, either high or low, those
sub-groups in the three feedback conditions did not have M-C SD scale
means which differed significantly from the total mean for their
particular extreme group.
The second criterion for selection involved sex as each of the sub-
groups at either extreme was balanced for this variable. Studies both
past (Crowne and Marlowe; 1960) and more recent (Cosentino and Kahn,
1967) had found no significant differences between the means and variances
of male and female M-C SD distributions however it was felt that it
might have been presumptuous to assume a between-sex personality
equivalence for individuals v/ith similar M-C SD scale scores.
From the sample of students pre-administered the M-C SD scale, and
on the basis of the above criteria, a total of 72 subjects were chosen
and participated in the experiment;, 12 high M-C SD scale people and 12
low H-C SD people for each of the three feedback conditions.
I)E_SIGN
The experimental design was a 2x3x2 (two between and one within)
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analysis of variance. The first, two-leveled condition was the
personality variable represented by either a high or a low score on
the M-C SD scale. The three-leveled variable was the different types
of corrective feedback conditions consisting of negative (social
censure), positive (approving), and the neutral reinforcement schedules.
The within variable the two tasks were incorporated in the design in
counter-balanced fashion in order to control for possible sequential
effects.
MATERIALS AITD APPARATUS
The M-C SD scale, which is a true-false questionnaire, 33 items
long, V7as administered in conjunction with a computer scoring sheet.
The standard instructions for this instrument preceded the test items
along with additional information describing the correct spaces to
fill in on the scoring sheet representing either a true or false response
The stimulus patterns used for the two concept-attainment tasks
were geometric designs prepared on slides for use in a slide projector.
These geometric designs varied along four three-value dimensions. The
dimensions and their values were: form (square, diamond, and triangle)
color (orange, yellow, and green), Arabic number inside of each form
(1, 2, and 3), and type of border around form (none, dotted and solid).
Total number of instances (slides) generated by the four three-valued
dimensions described was 81. During the performance of the two concept-
attainment tasks each slide was presented to each subject one at a time
(reception strategy) in exactly the same random order.
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A sample chart showing all possible values of each dimension
was left exposed at all times. The subject and the experimenter
sat in the same room, with the subject's back toward the experimenter.
Two specially built electric consoles with lights and toggle switches
were used for subject choice and experimenter feedback. Presentation
of stimuli v;as performed by remote-control of two slide-projectors
situated directly in back of the subject with the slides being pro-
jected directly on the wall in front of him. Response latency was
recorded on graph paper of a single-needle chronographer which
traveled at the rate of 1 millimenter per 0.7 second.
PROCEDURE
At the outset of the concept-attainment tasks, all subjects were
given detailed oral instructions describing the stimulus population.
These instructions were worded as follows:
In this experiment we are interested in how
various individuals go about solving conceptual
tasks. These tasks use a series of illustrated
slides which will be displayed, one at a time,
on the wall in front of you. Each of the slides
contains one geometric figure representing four
different dimensions, with three values for
each dimension. On the wall in front of you,
you wil see a chart illustrating the four
dimensions and the three values for each dimension.
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— Dimension //I is form, and its three values,
shovm to the right of it, are diamond, square
and triangle.
— Dimension #2 is color, the geometric shapes
just mentioned can be colored green, orange,
or yiellow.
— Dimension //3 is the Arabic number inside
each form, and its values are the numbers
1, 2, and 3.
— Dimension #4 is the kind of border around
each shape; a solid border, a dotted border,
or no border.
Following this description of the task materials and an elicitation
of the subject's comprehension of these materials, each subject was re-
quired to participate in a practice task consisting of a simple uni-
dimensional concept of only one value. In the practice task, each sub-
ject was required to move a switch to a "yes" or "no" position if he
believes a stimulus card does nor does not include the correct value
no border and the conceptual rule (any card having the value no border
on it was an example of the correct concept). In this practice task,
the other three dimensions were irrelevant to solution.
The rationale for the inclusion of a preliminary task was to (1)
reduce unwanted inter-individual variability (error variance) due to
differences in acclimatization to the task materials, procedures, and
equipment and (2) to present an opportunity for the assimilation by S
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of the particular type of experimenter corrective feedback conditions
(neutral, censuring, or approving) which he underwent.
The instructions for the practice task read as follows:
Let's do a simple practice problem first.
In it I will be thinking of only one of
the values on the chart, and you must find
out which value I am thinking of. After
the slide is exposed on the wall in front
of you, you shall indicate whether the
slide does or does not contain the value
I am thinking of. If you think it does,
push the switch in front of you to the
"yes" position; if you think it doesn't,
push it to the "no" position.
At this point the content of the instructions varied depending upon
the particular experimenter feedback condition the S had been assigned to
For the neutral feedback condition the instructions stated;
If you are correct in your choice, then
the white light directly in front of you
shall flash on. If you are incorrect, the
amber light will flash on.
For the censuring feedback condition, the instructions stated:
If you are correct in your choice, then
the white light directly in front of you
shall flash on and we shall go on to the
next card. If you are incorrect in your
choice, I shall inform you of this by
saying "wrong" and the amber light will
flash on.
For the approving feedback condition, the instructions stated:
If you are correct in your choice, I
shall inform you of this by saying
"right" and the white light will flash
on. If you are incorrect in your
coice the amber light will flash on.
After allowing for this instructional variability, which specif
the particular corrective feedback condition to which the subject be
longed, the instructions for the practice task continued along, exac
the same for all subjects as follows;
Before we begin this practice task, I
am going to give you a clue and state
that the one value I am thinking of is
associated with one of the two dimensions
of border or number. The two other
dimensions, and their associated values,
form and color, do not have to be con-
sidered. A last v7ord is that in order
for this practice task to be considered
successfully solved, you must be correct
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in your choice of "yes" or "no" for ten
consecutive slides.
After successful completion of this simple practice task, the
instructions for the main experimental tasks was worded as follows:
Now we shall go on to the main task. In
• this task, as in the practice task, the
sequence in which the slides appear is
not important, since they are randomly
presented on the wall. The task is
different from the practice task in
important ways. The first difference
is that now not one but two values are
important, and you must discover which
these two values are.
As before, I am going to give you a clue
and state that the two values I am
thinking of are associated with the two
dimensions of form and color. The two
other dimensions and their associated
values, number and border, do not have
to be considered.
The reason for the introduction of these clues, which gave the sub-
ject a correct dimensional focus, was founded upon the experience of
this writer with this type of concept-attainment task. Just as a minimum
difficulty level is required, so too was an optimal level desired. This
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optimal level should be such that a reliably long sampling of sub-
ject behavior can be obtained while at the same time there would not
be any sizeable attrition of N due to too many subjects who cannot
solve the problem within a practically feasible time. The clues as
to the correct dimensions enhanced the goal of an optimum difficulty
level for this type of concept-attainment task.
The first dependent measure was response latency which was
averaged for each individual while the second was a record of the
number of instances (slides) which the subject required to solve the
problem, with the criterion of problem-solution requiring 10 consecutive
correct responses. Further after the subject had achieved this operational
criterion he had to verbally state the two correct values and also the
rule which governed their relationship: ex; for the conjunctive task
"both together", "always on the same slide", etc. For the disjunctive
task "can be either one or the other", "can be by themselves" "doesn't
have to be together", etc.
The inter-trial interval for presentation of the task stimuli was
automatically set at 5 seconds. It was found that this interval allowed
ample time for the experimenter to record the subjects response and give
the appropriate feedback. Of those individuals selected for the ex-
periment only three proved unable to understand the procedure even after
completion of the practice task and were disqualified from the experiment
and replaced by three others. This experimenter during presentation of
the task stimuli verbalized the feedback, either approving or dis-
approving, with a studied monotone neither varying the intensity or
the inflection throughout a particular sequence of presentations.
It should be noted however, that for those individuals who took,
relatively speaking
,
an excessive amount of time in responding to the
stimuli this investigator was aware of subjective feelings of im-
patience which may have influenced adversely his attempt at standard-
izing the verbal feedback.
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RESULTS
With respect to the hypotheses which have been made, and taking them
In the order in which they have been presented, the statistical
analysis indicated the following results.
1. The first hypothesis pertains to the relationship
between the independent variable type of experi-
menter feedback and the dependent variable latency
of response. This hypothesis was not supported;
the approving type of experimenter feedback did
not result in shorter response latency as com-
pared to the length of latency under the neutral
condition.
Insert Table 1 and 15
2. The second hypothesis was not confirmed. The dis-
approving type of experimenter feedback was not
associated with a significantly longer average
response latency than was the neutral experimental
feedback condition.
Insert Table 1 and 15
3. The third and last hypothesis which pertained to the
type of experimenter feedback and average latency
of response was predicated upon statistically sig-
nificant findings occurring between these independent
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and dependent variables and stated that these
significant findings would hold under two levels
of problem difficulty, disjunctive and conjunctive.
Needless to say the lack of significance des-
cribed invalidates this particular hypothesis.
Insert Table 5 and 15
The second set of hypotheses pertained to the independent variable
high or low M-C SD scale score and the dependent variable average
latency of response. The statistical analysis indicated the following:
A. It was hypothesized that if in fact there is a
defensive avoidant component associated with a
high M-C SD scale score, individuals in this group
under the disapproving condition would have a
longer average latency of response than high M-C
SD people in the control or neutral feedback
condition. Reference to Table A indicates that
this did occur; however, Table 15 demonstrates
no significant differences between these two
means. Therefore this fourth hypothesis is
rejected.
Insert Table 4 and 15
5. This hypothesis was concerned with the average response
latency of the high M-C SD individuals in the approving
condition vls-a-vis high M-C SD people In the
neutral feedback condition. The rationale was
that If the high M-C SD scale score Is In fact
reflective of approval-seeking this would arouse
approach types of behavior. Hence there would
be shorter average response latencies of the
highs under the approving condition versus the
highs under the neutral condition. As indicated
in Table A this did not occur and in fact the
high M-C SD people under the approving condition
had a somawhat longer average latency of response
than those under the neutral though the difference
was not significant as indicated by Table 15.
6. This hypothesis was concerned with whether the
predictions made earlier (involving hypotheses
four and five) would hold under the two levels of
problem difficulty, the disjunctive task versus
the relatively easier conjunctive task. Since the
predictions were not confirmed this particular
hypothesis is rendered invalid.
Insert Table 7 and 15
The third and last set of hypotheses pertained to the dependent var
measuring efficiency of problem solving, that is the number of tria
needed to reach a criterion of problem solution, and to the two
independent variables involving the personality measure of high
and low M-C SD scale scores and the three experimentally man-
ipulated feedback conditions; neutral, approving, and disapproving.
7. Based upon the findings of prior research it was
hypothesized that the efficiency of the high M-C
SD person under censuring feedback V70uld be im-
paired resulting in a significantly higher number
of trials to solution than that of the low M-C
SD individual. Both Tables 11 and 16 indicate
respectively first the means and second there
are no significant differences between these means.
Insert Table 11 and 16
The efficiency of both personality groups high and low M-C SD
under the disapproving feedback condition is approximately the
same
.
8. This hypothesis again was based upon prior studies
and stated the converse of the seventh hypothesis
namely that high M-C SD groups under the approving
condition v;ill be more efficient than the lows
and would require fev^er number of trials to criterion.
The statistical analysis indicates just the opposite.
The high M-C SD subjects were less efficient in solving
the problems under the approving feedback.
Insert Table 11
9. The final hypothesis pertained to the level of
problem difficulty and differences in problem
solving efficiency as a function of the person-
ality variable. It was generated by the prior
two hypotheses, seven and eight, and by a study
cited in the introductory section of this in-
vestigation. It stated that the effects pre-
dicted for hypotheses seven and eight would be
most pronounced with the more difficult dis-
junctive conceptual task. Referring to Table
14 and 16 it can be seen that the feedback X
personality scale X task interaction was not
significant
.
Insert Table 14 and 16
The nonsignificant differences betwen the high and
lo\-f M-C SD groups under the censuring feedback
condition hold up under both the difficult disjunctive
task and the easier conjunctive task and the same is
tcue for the approving feedback condition.
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DISCUSSION
One primary focus of this investigation was to attempt to ascertain
whether a high score on the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale
(M-C SD scale) was indicative of both a high need for approval (n-app.)
and a high level of def ensiveness as the originators of the scale claim
or whether, as other investigators hypothesized, a high scale could onlv
be interpreted as measuring defensiveness alone. The initial portion of
this investigation outlined research findings first supporting the high
(n-app.) and def ensiveness point of view and then included a review of
that literature which substantiated a def ensiveness only hypothesis.
After t:-.e presentation of conflicting opinions and review of litera-
ture cited as evidence by both sides this investigator set forth an ex-
periinent which he felt might contribute to the resolution of the opposing
views regarding this personality measure. This experiment v;as founded
upon certain assumptions and research findings. Though these assumptions
and findings are intertwined with each other, for the sake of clarity it
is best to consider them separately.
In order to define def ensiveness and approval seeking it was first
assumed that terras which could be substituted, and which had the advantage
of being more measurable were, respectively, avoidance and approach.
Using avoidance as an operational measure of def ensiveness does not appear
to be that unwarranted since personality theories, research findings,
and everyday life experience. all offer evidence that avoidance behavior
can be and is used in this manner. Likewise, although approval-seeking
can take many behavioral forms within the human context, approach- types
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of behavior nay be one of the more prominent of these forms. Avoidance
and approach can be measured spatially or temporally, that is in terms
of amount of distance or of time. It was with respect to amount of
time elapsed between presentation of a stimulus, in this case conceptual
task stimuli, and subject response that this experiment quantified
avoidance and approach. More specifically the dependent measure, re-
sponse latency, was reflected in seconds with decimal places rounded
off to one-hundreth of a second.
The above is a description of the assumptions underlying the selection
of the dependent measure, response latency. Another primary assumption
related to the design of the experiment and vjas responsible for the se-
lection of the particular feedback conditions described in the methodology.
It was assumed that three feedback conditions could be established which,
in general, without consideration of personality variables, would result
in average response latencies which were shortest for a positively re-
inforcing verbal feedback, longest for a negatively reinforcing verbal
feedback, and intermediate when non-verbal visual cues, specifically
lights, were used as feedback. It was felt that this last condition, by
dint of its intermediate average response latencies, could be characterized
as "neutral" with respect to the other two feedback conditions. More
specifically it was assumed a "neutral" feedback condition could be es-
tablished since there is research precedence for the predictions of the
ordinal rankings of the average response latencies for the two verbal
feedback conditions (Buss, 1956).
The rationale for the attempt to establish a "neutral" condition was
two-fold. First it was hoped that within the confines of' this experiment
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establishing this intermediate response latency condition would lend
empirical substantiation to the assumption described earlier that is
brief response latency can indicate approach behavior which in turn can
be taken as a manifestation of approval seeking. And, also, prolonged
response latency under negative feedback would give confirmation to the
labeling of the slower reaction time as avoidance behavior which in turn
can be considered as indicative of defensiveness
.
In addition to attempting to justify the labeling of two verbal
feedback conditions, a second reason for attempting to set up a "neutral"
condition resides in the usage of the control group in psychological re-
search. In the design of this particular experiment the neutral feedback
condition was also intended to function as a control group. The procedure
of this feedback condition was exactly that of the other two with the sole
exception of the verbali^^ations "right" or "wrong" being ommirted.
The last few paragraphs have been devoted to a description of the
logical assumptions underlying the selection of the dependent variable, '
response latency. Additionally there was focus upon the necessity for the
establishment of a "neutral" feedback condition both in terms of lending
accuracy semantically , to the labeling of the two verbal feedback conditions,
and also in terms of its' functioning as a control group which would put to
stringent test the acceptance or rejection of a need for approval construct
associated with the M-C SD scale.
However, a statistical trend did not occur in which response latencies
in the so-called neutral condition were, on the average, intermediate with
those of the verbal feedback conditions. In this experiment, the lack of
statistical results, both in terms of significance and the desired mean
trend for the average response latencies Indicate a failure In establish-
ing a neutral feedback condition and consequent adequate control group.
Therefore this experiment cannot offer any resolution of the theoretical
controversy.
Perhaps one of the first, most obvious speculation, which could be
made as to the failure in establishing significant findings with the
dependent measure, response latency, was that it was correlated with the
second measure, trials to criterion. That is that the tendency of an in-
dividual to respond quickly or slowly to the task stimuli is influenced
by the ability of the individual to solve the problem efficiently.
A simultaneous comparison of the group means for the two dependent
variables indicates no such correlative relationship. No clearcut pattern
can be observed whereby average reaction time can be established as a co-
factor in either a more efficient or less efficient solution of the problem.
While the efficiency of the low M-C SD group is approximately the same
across feedback conditions there is relatively greater variability in
average response latency. Conversely we find relatively substantial
variability across feedback conditions for the high M-C SD group in trials
to solution while, compared to the lows, the variability of mean response
latencies is less. A Pearson product moment calculated between the two
dependent measures for the 72 subjects indicates an r = + .15 which is
nonsignificant
.
Comparative observations of the means of the two dependent variables,
and a statistical calculation indicate no correlative trend. Instead the
relationship appears to be random v.'hich in turn tends to invalidate the
speculation that the lack of significant findings among groups for average
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latency of response was due to differing capabilities of the groups in
problem solving efficiency.
Focusing upon the methodology as the problem area the appropriate-
ness of the modalities of the feedback conditions, verbal and an Im-
personal visual cue, could be questioned. In the methodology of those
studies of most relevance, in terms of examining response inhibition as
a function of different types of feedback, we find that the procedural
differences outweigh the similarities with this experiment. Direct
comparison of the results of other studies with this one is rendered
difficult because others (Buss, A. 1950, Byers, J. L.
,
1965, Marlett, N. J,
and Watson 1968, Sechest, L., and Wallace, J., 1962, Wallace, J. 196A) did
not establish a third or neutral feedback condition.
Further the combinations of feedback modalities used, were, for
the most part distinctly different, V7ith the exception of one study
(Kates S. and Barry W. 1970) which used both verbal and visual feedback.
In two studies which most closely approximated this one in terms of the
use of a precise time measure, response latency, only verbal feedback
("right or wrong") was used in one (Buss A. 1950) or impersonal auditory
feedback (a buzzer) was used in the other (Marlett N. and Watson D. 1968).
Despite the lack of precedence in attempting to establish a neutral con-
dition and the dissimilarities in the types of feedback modalities or
dependent measures used it is important to note that the results of this
experiment are not contradictory v.'ith other findings. That is the mean
trend, specifically with respect to the failure feedback condition, was
congruent in that this type of feedback result in greater response in-
hibition. However, it should be noted the results of this study did not
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indicate statistically significant response inhibition.
What has been established by this investigation is that a neutral
condition and its defining attributes are difficult to establish. In
analyzing the inability to establish a neutral condition for latency of
response one can conjecture that perhaps some other type of feedback
would have been more appropriate. Perhaps the utilization of an im-
personal auditory signal at an intensity level just sufficient for dis-
crimination, as was done by Wallace (Wallace J. 1964) would have facili-
tated the establishment of a neutral condition. Several post hoc con-
jectures can be made regarding what might be a more appropriate type
of feedback; however, this essentially is an empirical question best
answered by further experimentation.
Another consideration concerning the inability to establish a neutral
condition is prompted by the average response latencies for those indivi-
duals under the verbal feedback conditions. They attained a consistently
longer reaction time than those in the visual feedback condition for both
the easy (conjunctive) and the difficult (disjunctive) task. One could
speculate that subjects in this experiment inhibited responding whether
the verbal feedback was approving or disapproving relative to an impersonal
visual one. The above is not meant as a generalization but as a statement
specific to this experiment. It is important to note this specificity
since it is obvious that if the modality of the neutral feedback were in-
tense enough, a glaring light, a loud adversive noise, etc. then response
inhibition would have been much more likely under this circumstance.
Finally it is possible that the results of tliis investigation, with
respect to response latency indicate the difficulty of quantifying
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approach behavior. Because of the problem of controlling for the
subjective state of the individual response, latency
, used to assess
approach could be measuring disparate, if not contradictory, modes
of behavior. For example, it may well have been that of the group of
individuals under the approving condition some may have responded
more quickly to gain approval while others may have responded more
slowly in order to insure an approving response from the experimenter.
The thrust of this experiment encompassed two broad areas of in-
quiry. The first, which has just been discussed, involved an attempt
to resolve a theoretical controversy in the realm of personality re-
search and this attempt, for any one or all (or none) of the reasons
speculated upon .produced unsatisfactory findings. The second broad
area was concerned with ascertaining possible personality environ-
mental interactive effects which may affect problem solving behavior.
Specifically this investigator was interested in whether groups having
extremely high or low scores on the M-C SD scale v;ould exhibit differ-
ences in problem-solving efficiency with concept attaininent problems
under different verbal conditions, approving and disapproving.
A number of findings described earlier served as a foundation
for the conjecture that the high M-C SD groups, under censuring feed-
back would be more impaired than the lows in efficiently solving
concept-attainment problems
.
while just the reverse would occur under
approving feedback conditions. It also seemed logical to this in-
vestigator that if an individual scored high on a scale designed to
assess how much he v/ished to present himself in a socially desirable
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light, that especially with college students who would be more
keenly attuned to intellectual accomplishment relative to the
general population, their cognitive functioning would be more
vulnerable to disruptive impairment under censuring feedback con-
ditions. Obversely it also seemed logical that the supportive
environment of a strictly approving feedback condition would have
more positive impact with respect to the cognitive functioning of
the high M-C SD vis-a-vis that of the lows.
The results of this experiment did not lend support to the
hypotheses. The high M-C SD individuals under the censuring feed-
back condition did not perform in any significantly inferior fashion
than the lows in efficiency of problem-solution, and, paradoxically
in light of aforementioned empirical results and logical inferences
made, the high M-C SD people were inferior to the lows in problem-
solving efficiency under the approving feedback condition.
The analysis of variance and the means for trials to solution
indicated that the significant main effect for the feedback conditions
were the result of the significant interactive effects between the
feedback conditions and the personality variables. Statistical tests
conducted to assess which pair of means made the primary contribution
to the significant interactive effect yielded at- 2.16 wiiich v;as
significant at p -^-^ ^or the groups of high M-C SD individuals under
the neutral and approving conditions. The next largest difference
between group means, the high M-C SD Individuals in the approving
and disapproving^ condition, yielded a t = 1.77 which was not significant
Ler
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making further tests of significance between subgroups with small,
mean differences unnecessary.
In essence then results which were expected to occur with the
high M-C SD people under the "positive" unconditionally approving
feedback situation occurred under a neutral condition which was free,
relatively speaking, from an intense evaluative atmosphere. To ex-
plain these somewhat paradoxical findings the procedural similarities
of this study with the more relevant experiments described in the first
part of this paper should be commented upon. Factually the similarities
prove to be almost nil for whereas the feedback in the prior studies
were either inferred as a self
-regulatory mechanism, conveyed in a
covert, subtle manner so that S was at best dimly aware of it, or made
quite overt but with relatively long time intervals interspersed in
between delivery, the feedback in this experiment was methodologically
quite different. In this study the verbal feedback was almost intrusive
in that it occurred quite explicitly every time S made a response and,
as a consequence, had a relatively high frequency of occurrence within
a brief span of time.
Keeping this in mind it should be recalled that the theoretical
controversy, which was not resolved by this study, focused upon the
validity of the two hypothetical constructs which were inferred from
a high M-C SD scale score, high n-app. and def cnsiveness and it was the
former construct, high n-app., that was viewed quite dubiously. However
there did not seem to be any quarrel with the more general association
of a higli M-C SD score with a need to present oneself in a socially
desirable light. It is this investigators, albeit quite speculative,
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contention that this consenually agreed upon "evaluative dependency",
as Crowne and Marlowe call it, of the M-C SD person in conjunction
with the particular verbal feedback procedure utilized in this study,
may have interacted and engendered a state of distractability which
impaired functioning in those abstract skills requisite for efficient
conceptual probleii) solving. It could be hypothesized that when the
interpersonal evaluative aspect of the feedback is modulated, as was
done under the neutral feedback condition, the experiment does yield
results somewhat consistent with those of prior findings with the
M-C SD scale and paired-associate learning (Crandall, 1968) and motor
skill tasks (Strickland and Jenkins, 1964; Wellington and Strickland,
1965; Strickland, 1965).
If this speculation of a state of distractability as an intervening
variable has any veracity then both specific and general questions are
posed. Specifically the initial perspectives assumed by this experi-
ment on the nature of reinforcement, and of its effects, have to be
modified. The complexity of a reinforcement procedure is that even
that procedure whicli ostensibly appears quite simple may contain para-
meters such as modality, frequency of occurrence, and degree of intensity
acting in some unknown interrelated fashion which must be recognized and
taken into account if one is to make accurate predictions as to its
effects. This statement is especially true when an experimenter attempts
to ascertain or predict how a procedure is going to influence the be-
havior of a complex organism such as an adult human being.
Generally, if there is any validity to the speculation advanced as
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an explanation for the outcome of this Investigation then broader
implications are generated for that aspect of Behavioristic Psychology
having to do with principles of reinforcement. As is well known, these
principles were formulated and developed in the psychological laboratory
primarily with infra-human organisms. These principles have been
frequently applied with empirically documented success with emotionally •
disturbed, exceptional, and retarded children and chronic, insti-
tutionalized, populations being perhaps the most notable examples. The
results of this experiment do endorse to a small degree a prevailing
opinion among many social exientists that these principles of rein-
forcement are not as simply applied with any high degree of efficacy
and/or predictability when one is dealing with an adult human being
who possesses complex and intricate capacities for thought and reflec-
tion. However the most obvious criticisim which can be made of the
hypothesized explanation derives from an examination of the results for
the group high on the M-C SD scale under the disapproving feedback
.
condition.
The question arises as to why wasn't an efficiency, impairing
state of distractability evident under this feedback condition, which,
if anything should be considered mqre_ distracting because of the negative,
evaluative connotation of the verbal feedback ("Wrong"). These par-
ticular results pose a rather critical refutation of the post hoc
theorizing in v;hich this investigator has been engaging and it is
difficult to reconcile thorn with the causal explanation of the findings
under the "neutral" and "approving" feedback conditions.
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Perhaps the answer to this seemingly inherent contradiction re-
sides again in what personality characteristics the M-C SD scale
purports to measure. Earlier it was noted that it was the consensus
of practically all researchers that people who obtained a high score
have more of a tendency to be concerned about what others think of
them. In addition it was also agreed by most, if not all, that de-
fensiveness was a ramification of this dependency upon the opinions of
others. It was the construct, need for approval, which generated dis-
agreement among investigators.
Substantiating the def ensiveness construct waf? a wealtli of em-
pirical findings. The high M-C SD scale person has been described as,
rigidly defensive in goal-setting (Barthel, 1961), terminates psyclio-
therapy early in order to avoid the disapproval of the therapist
(Strickland and Crowne, 1963), gives constricted, defensive, low Rorschach
M projective test protocols (Tutko, 1962; Lefcourt 1969), and, under
various types of social situations behaves, in defensive fashion.
Further evidence includes studies which have used the scale as a measure
of defensiveness (Fisher and Kramer, 1963; Boor and Schill, 1967;
Schill and Althoff, 1968).
Though this reasoning may appear specious a thought which has
occurred to this Investigator was that because of this defensive aspect
of his personality the high M-C SD person was not caught off guard,
distracted if you will, by non-supportive « negative responses from F
when he committed an error. Phrased differently, since evidence in-
dicates he is predisposed to expect the worst and therefore adoi)ts a
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defensive stance in a variety of interpersonal situations, then a
learnins task in which verbally punitive responses from E were used
did not pose any unexpected surprise. Because of this, unlike under
the approving condition, his concentration on the task was not impaired
and he performed as well as the other groups.
It is obvious that in attempting to account for results with the
dependent measure, trials to solution, this investigator has engaged
in a network of speculations. Whether or not a case can be made for
more viable explanations this Investigator hopes that the results obtained
will of theiaselves have some provocative or heuristic value.
To conclude a brief summary is in order. First the results of
this experiment do not controvert but do in fact lend some crpdcnco to
the notion that the high M-C SD scale individual has an "evaluatxcn-
orientation" or dependency upon the opinions of others. However a more
ambitious goal of this study, to analyze the nature of this orientation
was not realized. Further there was some evidence offered of the im-
portance of the interaction between personality and environmental viriable
upon an individuals cognitive functioning. Finally broader implications
were alluded to pertaining to certain principles of Behaviorism . The
unex))ected results of this study offer some small endorsement to the
conception that attempts to predict human response on the basis of
systematic manipulation of external reinforcement is difficult even
when certain personality characteristics are taken into account.
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TABLE 1
Me^"A_ajld_^tandan^ for averar.e resp on<; e latencies for
the three feedback condition
.
APPROVING DISAPPROVING
MHAHS 4.66 5.15 5.69
STAInDAPJ) deviations 1.92 2.12 2 96
TABLE 2
Mea:ns_and_^ndard^^^
^'O^^JJ^^Mtj^pjidi^i^ons high or low score on thP. M-r. SD scale.
HIGH M-C SD LOW M-C SD
MEAWS
. 5.24 5.10
STANDARD DEVIATIONS ' 2.12 2 48
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TABLE 3
^lgan§__and_sl^^^^^ avera^.e response latencies for the
two concept atualnmcnt tasks
^
CONJUNCT IVE DISJUNCTIVE
Ml^Al^S 5.48 4.86
STAi.'DAriD DEVIATIONS 2.57 2.13
TABLE 4
Means and standard deviations for average response latencies of the
personality ;^roups under the three feedback cond t ions
.
HIGH M-C SD LOW M-P <^'n
IJEUTRAL MEAIIS 5.11 4.21
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 2.03 1.75
APPROVING MEANS 5.16 5.15
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 1.81 2.37
DIS.\PPROVING MEANS 5.45 5.93
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 2.58 3.35
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TABLE 5
Means and standard deviations for average response latencies of the
two tasks under the three feedback conditions.
CONJUNCTIVE DISJUNCTIVE
NEUTRAL MEANS 5.02 4.31
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 1.60 2.06
APPROVING MEANS 5.A1 A. 90
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 1.82 - 2.13
DISAPMOVING MEAiNiS 6.01 5.37
.STANDARD DEVIATIONS 1.81 3.01-
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TABLE 6
Meang^and sLandard deviations for average response latencies for the
two personality conditions with the two tasks.
CONJUNCTIVE DISJUNCTIVE
HIGH M-C SD MEANS 5.58 4.89
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 2.23 3.07
LOW M-C SD MEANS 5.37 4.82
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 2.7% 3.32
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TABLE 7
^qg-gnd^tandar d deviations for avera.qe response latencies of the two
personall
_ty_£rou£s__u_nder the three feedback conditions for the two tasks.
NEUTRAL
APPROVING
DISAPPROVING
CONJUNCTIVE DISJUNCTIVi'"
HIGli M-C SD MEANS 5.51 4.71
ST/vNDARD DEVIATIONS 2.34 1.69
LOW M-C SD MEANS 4.52 3.91
STANDAPJ) DEVIATIONS 2.12 1.30
HIGli M-C SD MEAInIS 5.25 5.06
SIAiluARD DEVIATIONS 1.55 2.11
LOW M-C SD MEANS 5.57 4.73
STAiNlDARD DEVIATIONS 2.53 2.20
HIGH M-C SD MEAi^IS 5.99 4.91
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 2.80 2.33
LOW M-C SD MEANS 6.03 5.84
STAiNDARD DEVIATIONS 3.68 3.14
6A
TABLE 8
Means_and^anJard deviations for trials to solution for the three
feedback condi_tio n s
.
NEUTRAL APPROVING D ISAPPROVING
MEANS 17.69 26.52 18.52
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 20.19 22.72 19.20
r
Mcans_mid_stand^
solution for the two
personal_U^/_cjDr^^
, MGilJl-.C_SD LOW M-C SD
^^^^^'^^ 21.07 20.75
STAl^DAPJ) DEVIATIONS 18.75 22 23
/
66
TABLE 10
Means_ajid_sj.anda^^^ to solut ion for the two c once^pt-
attainment tasks.
CONJUNCTIVE DISJUNCTIVE
^^EAI^S 12.21 29.61
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 9.09 2^1 31
I
I
1
I
67
TABLE 11 !
I
Means and standard_Je^atlons for trials to^ljxt: Imw^f
.J;]^^
personality p,roups under the three feedback conditions.
HIGH II-C SD LOW M-C SD
NEUTRAL MEAIs'S 13.88 21.50
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 15. 8A 22.74
APPROVING MEAInS 32.17 21.72
STAITOARD DEVIATIONS 23.75 21.72
DISAl'PROVING MEAInIS 17.17 19.88
STAITOARD DEVIATIONS 16.52 21.91
I
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TABLE 12
Means and standard deviations for trials to solution of tlie
under the three fecdbackcondltlons
.
CONJUNCTIVE DISJUNCTIVE
NEUTllAL MEANS 10.75 2A. 63
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 8.11 25.63
APPROVING MEANS 16.04 27.00
STAIiDARD DEVIATIONS 10.01 2A.60
DISAPPROVING MEANS 9.83 27.21
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 9.01 22.36
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TABLE 13
Means and standard deviations for trials to solution for the two
personality conditions with the two tasks
.
CONJUNCTIVE DISJUNCTIVE
HIGH M-C SD MEANS 13.36 28.78
STAITOARD DEVIATIONS 11.41 24.36
LOW M-C SD MEANS 11.06 30.44
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 8.98 23.75
TABLE 14
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Means^nj_^t^ard deviations for trials to solu tion of the two
personality groups under the three feedback conditions for the
two tasks.
NEUTRAL
APPROVING
DISAPPROVING
CONJUNCTIVE DISJUNCTIVE
HIGH M-C SD MEAI-TS 10.08 17.67
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 9.25 20.19
LOW M-t SD MEAiiS 11.42 31.58
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 10.17 27.30
HIGH M-C SD MEANS 20.50 43.83
STANDARD DEVIATIONS 11.34 27.24
LOW M-C SD MEANS 11.58 30.17
STAND/iRD DEVIATIONS 11.43 25.84
HIGH M-C SD MEANS 9.50 24.83
STAInIDARD DEVIATIONS 8.21 19.37
LOW M-C SD MEANS 10.17 29.58
STAITOARD DEVIATIONS 7.17 27.32
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TABLE 15
Analysis of Varj^ance_ior_y._e_dependent measure Avera?;e Response Latency
SOURCE S.S. d.f
.
M.S. F
A (Feedback Conditions) 25.60 2 12.80
B (M-C SD scale) 0.67 1 0.67
C (Tasks) L
AB 11.74 2 5.87
AC 0.25 2 0.12
BC 0.18 1 0.18
S(AB) 512.72 66 7.77
ABC 3.59 2 1.80
SC (AB) 247.64 66 3.75
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TABLE 16
Analysis of Variance for the dependent measure Tripl e, ^n rr-i ^
SOURCE
s.s. d.f M.S. F
A (Feedback Conditions) 2,283.56 2 1,141.78 3. 18*
B (M-C SD scale) 3.67 1 3.67 -
C (Tasks) 10,902.84 1 10,902.84 30. 85**
AB 2,312.06 2 1,156.03 3. 22*
AC 301.06 2 150.53
EC 1A2.01 1 142.01
S(AB) 23,685.04 66 358.86
ABC 450.72 2 225.36
SC (AB) 23,328.08 66 353.47
* P -tC .05
** P ^.001

